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THE GREAT INERTIA: AN INTRODUCTION
TO A CAUSAL INQUIRY INTO TRADITIONAL
CHINA'S SCIENTIFIC STAGNATION1
QIAN WEN-YUAN

A General Explanation
While working at the Department of History at Northwestern University as a visiting scholar, I have recently finished drafting a threeessay critical and macro-historical analysis, which is entitled The Great
Inertia. I started this work about two and a half years ago, and now I can
bring what I consider a piece of good news. Recently in China there
appeared in one of the leading philosophical periodicals, Journal of
Dialectics of Nature, a special section discussing "the causes of China's
scientific and technological backwardness in recent times." I of course
take no personal credit for this event, but I am really very pleased with it,
because I think that after more than thirty years of blind selfglorification, this small official reorientation approaches a truly worthy,
genuinely significant, indeed uniquely important question for China. If
we trace the matter further back we may say that this is not a small
reorientation, but a departure from the long-established Stalinist tradition
in all Communist nations.
The three more or less independent essays of my manuscript are:
1. The Phenomenology of Chinese Stagnation in Physical Sciences;
2. Science and Technology in Traditional China—A Source Itself
Inert;
3. Needham's "Chinese Correlativism" and Misunderstanding of
Physics.
In this presentation I will mainly introduce the second essay, which is a
theoretical exposition, but I will first explain the whole scheme. The first
two papers discuss respectively the factual and the logical aspects of
Chinese inertia. In fact, I finished the second essay first and after that I
turned to a detailed Sino-Japanese comparative study. But my Northwestern colleagues wanted me to work on the first essay, that is the
"phenomenology." When they learned that my theoretical exposition
was accepted by this meeting, Professor David Joravsky and Professor
James Sheridan urged me to go through all of Needham's fat volumes and
2
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finish some serious study, because they did not want me to come to
Buffalo in a "vulnerable position." I was a reluctant student six months
ago. My excuses for this were that the Chinese inertia is obvious; I had
discussed some logical questions, had developed some interesting comparative observations, and had expounded a general theoretical
framework that looked promising. But I followed the guidance of senior
historians: I am not that stubborn in any case. Now I have done the other
two essays and I feel very happy and naturally grateful to my advisors.
The third essay is a shorter one. Although by the title it sounds
specialised, in fact it is not. Needham thinks that traditional Chinese
science was, and will be, marvelous. No one denies that traditional
Chinese science did not develop, or contribute directly to, modern science, which is undeniably characterised by mechanistic clarity and accuracy. But Needham stressed that traditional Chinese scientific thought,
the so-called "correlativism," will point to a certain futuristic scientific
methodology, the philosophy of organism. However, in the second
volume of his series, Needham consistently uses a false understanding of
a field of force, the relativistic idea of the order of consecutive events,
and some basic mathematical concepts to support his philosophical faith.
I think that his misunderstandings are not isolated minor errors, and it
may be worthwhile to put down my critique in black and white. It is not
that I am eager to grasp any opportunity to denigrate either Needham or
traditional Chinese scientific thinking; rather, it happens that I am a
"theoretical" reductionist and I do not share his faith in the organicist
philosophy.
Whenever I read in Needham's works a Chinese passage which talks
about the Yin and Yang, or what Needham names as the Pattern, the
Order, or resonance that embody the Tao, I knew that he would praise it
as very scientific, very illuminating, while I would frown at the same
passage. But I have not lost my sense of history and taken an anachronistic modern point of view. I frowned because of history, not in spite of it.
The so-called Needham Puzzle is this: with so much marvelous achievement, why did not medieval China develop modern science? My work
started by pursuing this Puzzle, and my conclusion is that different lines
of argument lead to the resolution (or rather the invalidation) of the
Puzzle: the pattern of China's past, the difficulty of China's present, and
the status of traditional Chinese science itself. When I looked at the
phenomenology of Chinese science, as voluminously presented in
Needham's works, I frowned. How could this essentially premodern
body of thought become modern without the necessary examination and
reexamination, criticism and counter-criticism, formulation and refor3
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mulation, mathematisation and re-mathematisation over many generations? Has traditional China at any rate offered the necessary politicoideological conditions to sustain the corresponding degree of intellectual
creativity? In other words, I doubt that China has ever provided a social
environment that would engender the necessary competition of creative
thinking and objective criticism, or the necessary examination through
empirical tests and rigorous reasoning.
I frowned because of history. The actual (and only) Scientific Revolution was a triumph of mechanistic thought. By analysing the inherent
relations between various fields of physics, it becomes clear that physics
could not be modernized otherwise. Consequently, in terms of scientific
contents, the Scientific Revolution—at least the "mechanical revolution" and the "physical revolution"—could not have emerged in a different order. In this way we can establish an objective criterion for
scientific "modernity," which is neither chronological nor based on
verifiability. By this criterion, not only Euclid and Archimedes were the
forerunners of modern physics, but even the mistaken Aristotelian "law
of falling bodies" was "modern," because it was clearly formulated and
subject to quantitative testing. Again, the mistaken and archaic
Ptolemaic planetary astronomy was "modern," because it correctly isolated the solar system and attempted orbital explanations. Also by this
criterion, the apogee of traditional Chinese science was not magnetism,
as Needham assumes, but the theoretical study of the musical scale,
which was crowned by Zhu Zai-yu's invention of the equal temperament
in 1584. In fact I think one of Needham's speculations is untenable. On
the first page of the volume that he devoted to Chinese physics he
wrote:"
7

8

9
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if the social conditions had been favorable for the development of modern
science [in China], the Chinese might have pushed ahead first in the study of
magnetism and electricity, passing to field physics without going through the
stage of "billiard-ball" physics. Had the Renaissance been Chinese and not
European, the whole sequence of discoveries would probably have been entirely different.

This argument fails to convince because the concept of a field of force in
modern physics is based on none other than the Newtonian concept of
"billiard-ball" interactions: fields are physical objects; fields interact
with particles or other fields in accordance with mechanical laws, either
Newtonian or quantum. The statistical nature of quantum physics by
no means negates the "law of physical causality." So long as we pay
casual attention to various types of photographic records of elementary
particle interactions, we would admit with alacrity that down to the
12
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depths of the material world, very much deeper than the ultimate
mechanisms that decide the essence of life, billiard-ball interactions
prevail, indeed exclusively.

A Theoretical Exposition

More than 60 years ago, Feng You-lan, then a young man working at
Columbia University, finished an inquisitive and provocative study on a
macro-historical topic. His essay, "Why China Has No Science—an
interpretation of the history and consequences of Chinese philosophy,"
was published in 1922 in the International Journal of Ethics. It was only
natural that this work was done after the so-called Chinese Renaissance,
in the wake of World War I, and by a Chinese student who was then
staying in the West. In the same year, 1922, Bertrand Russell published
his book The Problem of China, which he started by asking: "Can
Chinese virtues be preserved?" And he also told us: "The distinctive
merit of our civilization, I should say, is the scientific method; the distinctive merit of the Chinese is a just conception of the ends of life."
Meanwhile Feng You-lan concluded his own work by declaring: "Anyway, the Chinese conception of life may be mistaken, but the Chinese
experience cannot be a failure." Eastern iconoclasts and Western iconoclasts sometimes cannot see eye to eye on what is to be valued, and this
problem is still with us.
In retrospect what appears to be more ironic is that after these 60
years—during which dozens of nations changed beyond recognition—
Feng You-lan's basic question, "What keeps China back?" is now raised
again, while China's percentage of rural population is still among the
world's highest, while its level of per capita income and political enlightenment are still among the world's lowest! This can be explained
briefly. The 60-year span divides into two parts: in the first half China
was busy fighting, either civil wars or World War II; in the second half
China was busy boasting (about Mao's "achievements"), as well as
fighting (following Mao's instructions), and any study of China's traditional inertia would comprise a serious political offence. This period,
though short, was in fact a characteristic extension of the two-thousandyear traditional China.
Feng You-lan offered a pure philosophical solution to China's nondevelopment of modern science. His logic was:
"What keeps China back is that she has no science."
Why no science?
14
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"China has no science, because according to her own standard of
value she does not need any."
Why does she—did she—not need any science?
". . .China. . . devoted all her spiritual energy . . . to find good and
happiness directly in the human mind . . . China tried to know what is
within ourselves, and to find there perpetual peace."
To Feng, if Chinese philosophy had not discouraged people's interest
in the material world, if instead her people had been encouraged to
procure material goods from nature, then the desire and ability to control
nature would have arisen, leading to both Baconian quest for power and
Cartesian quest for certainty.
Therefore, although Feng's questioning sounds similar to the
Needham Puzzle that I mentioned before—why did not modern science
emerge in China?—these two schools arise from opposite points of view.
One, to which I belong, is embarked on a causal inquiry into China's long
stagnation, whereas the Needham school pours its energy into summarizing everything that smacks of science in Chinese history, partly in order
to correct a "total misconception" about China. The former raises
questions out of frustration; the latter, out of admiration.
Needham states that it is absolutely wrong to use words like inert,
stagnant, or changeless to describe China. Instead, he favors another set
of adjectives: homeostatic, cybernetic, in other words, self-regulative.
He writes:
19

20

21

22

23

For there was something in Chinese society which continually tended to restore it to its original character . . . after all disturbances, whether these were
caused by civil wars, foreign invasions, or inventions and discoveries.

Chinese historians have long taken notice of the political aspect of this
phenomenon, the dynastic cycles. Traditional China was indeed characterized by a pair of macro-historical opposites: internal and political
instability versus ideological and institutional continuity. It is precisely
this continuity, the continual tendency to restore Chinese society to its
original character, that justifies the application of the term inertia to
traditional China. Many scholars, Western as well as Chinese, particularly those who are anxious to drive China out of its inert state, take a
comparative or world wide outlook, and describe China with critical
terms such as inertia and stagnation. Ironically, although Needham is
doubtless one of the scholars most familiar with the characteristic
Chinese inertia (as clearly shown in notes 23 and 35), he asserts it is
absolutely wrong to say so.
To this passage a year ago, I added a note which reads:
24
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On a question like this, or the even more sensitive yet less definable
question of national character, both foreigners and nationals are caught
between sensitivity to national pride on one side and a temptation to say
"the emperor is naked" on the other side. The balance between these two
sides, which differs from person to person, contributes to a scholar's
selection, evaluation, and presentation of historical facts and interpretations. As a Chinese national, I may easily be accused of being unpatriotic. Nonetheless, I choose to work this way, because I believe that in the
long run, there is no contradiction at all between being self-critical and
being patriotic.
(Therefore you can understand that I really have some reasons to be
pleased when I read in Chinese papers the contents of the latest issue of
the Chinese philosophical periodical Journal of Dialectics of Nature.)
On the question of basic Chinese retardation I again agree with Feng
You-lan in looking for "software" instead of "hardware" causes. By
"hardware" I mean technological hardware and hard sciences. In Feng's
work—although his generation did not use these terms—' 'software" was
China's guiding philosophy and social values, but my logic of answering
the question of nondevelopment differs from his:
Why did modern science not appear in traditional China?
Because in traditional China intelligence and manpower were not activated and directed to rational inquiries about nature.
Why not?
Because the ruling politico-ideological entity in traditional China officially discouraged, indeed socially despised, inquiries about nature and
intellectual concern in technology.
Why did this politico-ideological entity of traditional China function
differently from the Renaissance European politico-ideological ruling
bodies?
In traditional China, a territorially unified autocratic rule was efficiently aided by and closely combined with an equally unified ideological
control (the philosophical spirit of which was introspective, the academic
scope of which was officially limited and exclusively politico-ethical,
and the basic attitude of which hindered innovative practices and rationalistic inquiries). This unified symbiosis of political rule and ideological
control contrasted sharply with European pluralism, which was bifurcated at its topmost level—state and church—and was further divided by
its feudal separatisms, national rivalries, and religious disputes. European politico-economic dynamism and intelletual eclecticism had their
roots—at least potentially—in this pluralism. Besides, three important
European facts must not be neglected. First, in comparison with Con26

27

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol9/iss9/4

6

Wen-Yuan: The Great Inertia: An Introduction to a Causal Inquiry into Tradi
29

fucianism, the Judeo-Christian tradition is spiritually egalitarian. Consequently individualism has been a much stronger spiritual heritage in
Europe, while modern intellectualism demands independent judgment.
Second, again in comparison with the ruling Chinese ideology, Western
religion assumes the existence of the divine law-giver or, since the 13th
century, the heavenly ' 'watch-maker," while the Chinese law-giver, that
is the capricious autocrat, though bearing the label "the Son of Heaven,"
was assuredly a free-will human being. Third, the West's unique Greek
heritage had been lost only temporarily. But one may argue that the last
factor was rather incidental (consistent with my theory that "software
decides"): the intellectual legacy had lain untouched for centuries before
Western interest in it started to rise in the 12th century, as indicated in the
translation movement.
This theory must look conspicuously unorthodox by present-day
Chinese standards. A few months ago I read a 700-page Chinese book,
The Scientific and Technological Achievements in China's Past, compiled by the Institute of the History of Natural Sciences of Academia
Sinica, published in Peking in 1980. Its Preface contains the following
paragraph:
28

Except for short periods, China has for thousands of years kept its political
unification. Although a multi-racial nation, China has never been divided,
such as Europe has. We are even less like the Roman Empire or the Mongol
Empire which decayed after a short-lived power . . . The Chinese nation has
been in existence for 4,000 years on the earth and continuously growing
stronger and more prosperous. One of the major reasons for this strength, as is
embodied by the content of this book, is that we have our glorious scientific
and cultural achievements.

Needless to say, this book still belongs to the category of selfglorification. The interesting thing to me is the reverse logic in this
paragraph. I think the phrase "glorious scientific and cultural achievements" should be translated into "powerful ideological and effective
bureaucratic control," that maintained China's political unification and
cultural monotony and rigidity. It was China's imperial and ideological
unification that arrested China's scientific and cultural development.
China's long unification demonstrates not the strength of China but the
strength of the power that ruled China. As I have referred to before, the
dynastic cycles show at once political instability and ideological continuity. Hundreds of peasant rebellions, civil wars, nomadic invasions,
and dynastic shifts belie a true unifications. Except for a few mighty
dynastic periods, China was not truly powerful, because in the final
analysis the people were on the average not economically and intellectuPublished by BYU ScholarsArchive, 1982
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ally powerful. European people were comparatively powerful, and that is
why no single polity, political or spiritual, has ever succeeded in ruling
them all. Insofar as we are talking about the emergence of modern science, what is wrong about a disunited Europe? From Copernicus to
Newton, in a long list of great creative scientists, no two standing side by
side had as a rule the same nationality, or the same religious denomination. The situation shows the degree of intellectual activation of 16thand 17th-century Western Europe.
The comparison between China and Western Europe revealed to me
other analogues: the comparison of traditional China and ancient feudal
China, the comparison of traditional China and ancient Greece, and the
comparison between late traditional China and centralized-feudal Japan.
These parallel contrasts show that the competition among a cluster of
feudally or otherwise independent states, which share a common culture,
was a great stimulus to development. The Warring States period of pre221 BC China was recognizably a dynamic era in many ways, as it is
stated clearly by John King Fairbank, Carrington Goodrich, and others.
During that time learned men and craftsmen had lived in a much more
stimulating atmosphere than later, in imperially unified China. Contrary
to the Preface to The Scientific and Technological Achievements in China's Past that I referred to above, it was not a glorious science and culture
that guaranteed China's unification. Rather it was a dynastic China,
ideologically as well as politically unified, that underpinned the longlasting Chinese traditionalism and archaism. Had the condition of the
"One Hundred Contending Schools" lasted several centuries longer,
positive scientific results might have reached a much greater accumulation and the maturity of leading Chinese schools of thoughts might have
risen to a much higher level.
We still do not know to what extent Greek intellectual excellence
depends on the characteristic Greek competitiveness. We know about the
political and military hostilities among the ancient Greek city-states, and
their consequent uneven development. We also know about the tradition
of the Olympic Games. We are therefore tempted to assume that a kind of
un-institutonalized perennial "Intellectual Olympic Games" was responsible for the glorious heritage. Besides, competitiveness should be
understood broadly. When Aristotle left Athens and established his own
school he was looking forbetter competitive conditions for the sake of his
scholarship. If one is mystified by the prodigious accomplishments of the
logical structure of Euclidean geometry, then only by reading some
Greek philosophical and ethical works prior to Euclid can one reduce the
29
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feeling of mystery and awe. Besides, a learned man competes with
himself—once the ' 'chain reaction" of intellectual creativity is ignited.
The Chinese people usually described the Sino-Japanese proximity as
"yi yi-dai shui"—only one narrow strip of water (that separates the two
nations), and "tong wen tong zhong"—the same race and the same
writing system. It requires true insight to overlook superficial similarities
and reach a recognition of their essential differences. Edwin Reischauer
points out:
30

By the 12th century Japan was on the threshold of an even greater departure
from East Asian norms. This was the development of a feudal system, which
over the next seven centuries was to go through phases that had many striking
parallels to the feudal experience of Western Europe between the 9th and the
15th centuries.

Hence none of the numerous similarities, such as racial identity, geographical proximity, Confucianism, Buddhism, rice agriculture, the
self-sufficient agrarian economy, the writing system, many mutual cultural borrowings, etc. were decisive; but in the different politico-social
structures of the two societies lay the potentials which were realized in
the 19th century when both countries faced the threat of Western imperialism.
If we compare the contemporaneous Meiji Restoration and the
Chinese Westernization Movement in the 1860s, we have a good illustration for our theory that' 'software decides." In Japan, modernization was
carried out both in political institutions and economic constructions,
while in China the Manchu regime looked to the West for only superficial
technological imitations with the sole purpose of maintaining its outmoded political establishment. Small wonder the results on the two sides
emerged as a sharp contrast.
The relevance of these general comparisons to the rise of modern
science is obvious, because I believe, with Needham, that modern science is an inseparable part of general modernity, which also has its
economic, political, cultural and demographic aspects. With adequate
social conditions, the growth of science itself depends on the impetus for
systematizing natural phenomena, on the search for causes behind effects, on the reasoned organization of explanations and on the development of experimentation which serves at once as exploratory and testing
means. Therefore, with regard to the emergence of modern science we
may pose a list of questions:
Were scholars interested in natural phenomena?
Did they try to categorize and systematize natural phenomena?
31

Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 1982

9

32 Comparative Civilizations Review, Vol. 9 [1982], No. 9, Art. 4

Did they look for rational explanations?
Did social values encourage them to make persistent efforts in these
directions?
What was the attitude of the ruling politico-ideological entity towards
scholars' efforts in these directions?
Or rather, in a given politico-ideological environment, were there
possibilities for scholars to develop their intellectual interests in these
directions?
Because of inhibitions on and discouragement of independent thinking
and the greatly limited scope of scholarship in traditional China, the
answers to these questions for China were increasingly negative. On the
other hand, the significance of these six questions is in the order of their
appearance increasingly decisive for the emergence of modern science.
Finally we may try to explain the causes of traditional China's nondevelopment of science, and its general inertia, on an even broader basis:
The prerequisite of the growth of modern science is the growth of
"modernity" in general.
Within a sizeable realm of common culture, the growth of modernity,
and the growth of science in particular, depends on the degree of intellectual activation and creativity, which have their extensive, intensive,
pluralistic and inheritable aspects, and which serve constructive, innovative, explanatory, and exploratory purposes.
This formulation I call "the principle of degree of intellectual activation and creativity.
Owing to the following facts, traditional China was characteristically
low in the degree of intellectual activation and creativity:
a) The nature of the politico-social structure—an imperially unified,
monolithic hierarchy ruling over a vast population.
b) An autocratic, introspective, and immobile ruling ideology. It
helped to consolidate Chinese autocracy—relating to the previous point.
It was solely interested in politico-ethical relations. It advocated a
changeless world order. It muffled enterprising and independent spirits
which are necessary in pursuing exact knowledge. It lacked objectivity in
epistemological criteria.
c) An effective bureaucratic straitjacket. In traditional China the
time-honored, "democratic" system of civil service examinations was
the linchpin between political control and ideological indoctrination. T.
Najita, a scholar of Japan, has argued that the leaders of Tokugawa Japan
were not orthodox, they were in fact ideologically eclectic, and they had
no bureaucratic apparatus to enforce orthodoxy. It is safe to say that
32
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this Japanese situation was just the opposite of its Chinese equivalent. In
particular, the Chinese examination system was the bureaucratic apparatus that effectively sustained an orthodox ideology in China for
centuries.
Needham has a perceptive passage that describes China's scientific
stagnation:
34

35

The only trouble about the Chinese five-element theories was that they went on
too long. What was quite advanced for the 1st century was tolerable in the 11th
century, and did not become scandalous until the 18th. The question returns
once again to the fact that Europe had a Renaissance, a Reformation, and great
concomitant economic changes, while China did not.

During the millennium after the ninth century, the evolutionary pattern
of the history of Western Europe contrasts notably with that of traditional
China. At the western end of Eurasia, there were the Carolingian Renaissance, the spread of universities, the translation movement, the incorporation of Aristotelianism into Christian theology, the Renaissance,
the Reformations (both the Protestant and the Catholic), the Scientific
Revolution, the Enlightenment, and the Industrial Revolution. On the
eastern end of Eurasia, there was an equal number of, if not more,
dynastic shifts, rebellions and invasions. Hu Shi, however, in his 1933
Haskell Lectures in Comparative Religion, said that since the Tang
Dynasty there had already been five discernible "renaissances" in
Chinese history. (Now I believe scholars on both sides of the Taiwan
Straits would like to add a couple more to his list.) But Hu Shi also
analyzed the common defects of those pre-1919 Chinese renaissances.
Judging by the principle of degree of intellectual activation and creativity, I would say that he had only paid attention to the inheritability of
those movements—or more exactly their lack of inheritability.
In fact I think Liang Qi-chao (1873-1929), a great man of letters and
reformer, had a better summary of the history of Chinese thought. He did
not use the grand term "renaissance," but he mentioned four "periodic
tides of thought" since the Qin Dynasty. Excepting a minor aspect,
none of the "tides" shared any common denominator with the essential
ingredients that comprise modern science. The dominant Chinese
schools of thought offered too narrow and too exclusive a soil for the tree
of modern science to grow. What traditional China fatally lacked were a
series of totally new intellectual elements: new attitudes, new ways of
thinking, new fields of interests, new epistemological standards, and a
propitious social condition to produce, sustain, and promote them. From
time to time there appeared more or less isolated geniuses, yet they were
36
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not enough to sustain a genuine continuous Renaissance. Hence, in the
light of the principle of intellectual activation and creativity, we see that
the developmental Sino-European contrast illustrates, even better than its
structural counterpart, the characteristic Chinese inertia.
Zhejiang University
Northwestern University
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NOTES
1. Based on a presentation at the 12th annual meeting of the International Society for the
Comparative Studies of Civilizations (ISCSC) at Buffalo, NY, May 26 to 28, 1983.
In complying to the request of Dr. Vytautas Kavolis that 1 send him my work in this
aspect, of about twice the size of my presentation at the annual meeting, I have now
supplemented my presentation with a number of extended notes. Thus many of my key
arguments, in their bare-bones form, are included, while the text itself is the original oral
presentation, basically unchanged.
2. Zi-ren Bian-zhen-fa Tong-xing (Journal of Dialectics of Nature) Vol. 5, No. 2
(Beijing, April 1983).
3. In fact I have not yet had time to finish a serious study of all of Needham's published
volumes. The topic I had originally planned to write was "The Phenomenology of Scientific and Technological Stagnation in Traditional China." Since I could not finish working
on Needham and his collaborators' works on technology and engineering, the title of my
first essay was appropriately changed to "The Phenomenology of Chinese Stagnation in
Physical Sciences." This schematic change appears to be advantageous in hindsight, since
at the moment, in the scholarship of history of science, the difference between science and
technology, not their connections and unity, should be stressed.
4. In Science and Civilization in China Vol. II (Cambridge University Press, 1962),
Needham wrote:
The gigantic historical paradox remains that although Chinese civilization could not
spontaneously produce "modern" natural science, natural science could not perfect
itself without the characteristic philosophy of Chinese civilization (p. 340)
And,
But the philosophy of organism was not, to begin with, a product of European thinking; we suspect that Liebniz may have been influenced by it in its systematic NeoConfucian form. An unexpected vista thus opens before our eyes—the philosophy of
organism, essential for the construction of modern science in its present and coming
form, stemmed from the bureaucratic society of ancient and medieval China . . . (p.
339)
5. According to Needham, "Chinese correlativism" receives support from the modern
concept of a field of force. The following citations are from Science and Civilization in
China, Vol. II: "things influence one another not by acts of mechanical impulsion, but by a
kind of'inductance'" (pp. 280-81); ". . . as by a kind of mysterious resonance" (p. 281);
". . .it was because it was taking up its place in a field of force alongside other particles
similarly responsive. Causation was not 'particulate' but 'circumambient'" (p. 285); etc.
My refutation of this basic idea of Needham is that the concept of field interaction was
developed on the basis of the concept of mechanistic interaction and it is incorrect to oppose
them; there is nothing mysterious about "circumambient" causations, because they are
reducible to ' 'particulate" causations; indeed that was the original idea of the originators of
field physics. Therefore, if Chinese correlativism could not receive help from a mechanistic
view, neither can it derive any support from a field stand. In the following text, in relation to
the problem of whether field physics could emerge without going through the stage of
"billiard-ball" physics, I have outlined my argument in the same spirit.
Needham's other mistake is related to his understanding of the ancient Chinese
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paradox "Going to the State of Yiieh today, one arrives there yesterday." He likes
statements such as this because he thinks it supports his "Chinese correlativism" with the
concept of "timeless pattern." But the "Hui Shi paradox" is physically wrong, and so is
Needham, when he asserts that it is "as if it came out of a modern textbook of physical
relativity; it recognized the existence of different time scale in different place." (Vol. II, P.
193). But the problem here is more than changing time scales, because the order of one's
leaving one place and arriving at another place can never be inverted. Modern physical
relativity strictly asserted this conclusion on the basis of Einstein's principle of maximum
speed—the speed of light.
The third problem of Needham's in this aspect is mathematical. He distinguishes
geometry and algebra in order to advocate a philosophical doctrine. But this distinction is
unnecessary. At the level of philosophical abstraction, or according to the general understanding of a modern mathematician, geometry and algebra become one—in fact the former
becomes a part of the latter.
6. In a talk with Professor Joravsky about my paper "Needham's 'Chinese Correlativism' and Misunderstanding of Physics," he suggested that I read R. C. Lewontin's
"The Corpse in the Elevator," a recent article in the New York Review of Books (Jan. 20,
1983), to acquaint myself with some recent challenges to the mechanistic philosophy in life
sciences. I did, and found that, as Lewontin's reader, I can actually understand "the corpse
in the elevator" in just the opposite way from its author.
In this article, a non-reductionist biologist tells us he believes that:
Whether reductionist, holist, or dialectician, all parties agree on a materialist view that
everything in the world is some manifestation of matter and energy.
And,
Yet every materialist would have to admit that if I could build with transistors or wires
or whatever hardware an exact copy of my brain, and then set the electronic currents
flowing in it, as they are now flowing in my brain, that machine could have written this
sentence. That is, it could have contemplated its own existence.
So, a non-reductionist is reductionist enough. From these statements, life scientists like
Lewontin would agree that an effect is, in the final analysis, caused by a physical agent. In
other words, the "law of physical causality" works behind life. And, a non-reductionist
reminds us of the existence of modern mysticism:
In the past, the failure of embryogenesis to yield to the Cartesian program of cut and
paste has led to an alternative of an obscurantist holism or, worse, a belief in nonmaterial life force.
Lewontin also teaches me to some extent about the intellectual barriers that prevent a
prominent life scientist from being a reductionist:
Yet a study of all or any significant part of the interconnections and coupled oscillations of our millions of brain cells seems a task that would consume the three billion
years left before the sun becomes a red giant and fries all of life. We must face the
possibility that we will never understand the organization of the central nervous system
at any but the most superficial level.
If he believes that between theoretical reducibility and practical irreducibility there is a
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gap wider than three billion years, then being a reductionist simply means being an idealist,
or a dreamer.
In physics, some deep-rooted difficulties pose grave problems that are not just of a nature
of practicability. One of them is whether thermal phenomena can be reduced to the random
movement of a swarm of molecules. While working physicists—theoretical as well as
experimental—all answer this question affirmatively and do their research accordingly,
some philosophically sensitive physicists are aware that for a long time theoretical physics
has been pestered by a contradiction between two rigorously mathematical theories: the
Boltzmann H-Theorem and the Poincare-Zermelo Cycle-Theorem.
What is clear to everyone is that before using up the remaining three billion years, homo
sapiens will make some more progress, both materially and intellectually, and hopefully
also morally.
7. We can exemplify this generalization with some well-known developments in the
Western history of science: the slow clarification of the basic stand in planetary astronomy,
the realization of the concept of the vacuum (from Aristotle to Torricelli and Pascal), and
the development of the theory of motion, which involved 14 th century scholars at Paris and
Oxford.
8. What we want to, and can, clarify is the general significance of two historical developments. One is the three-stage "modernization" of mechanics; the other is that
mechanics precedes other fields of physics.
The three stages of mechanical development are: one, Archimedes' principles of the
lever and the buoyant (and immersed) bodies; two, Galileo's theorems on a terrestrial
falling particle (free falling, along an inclined plane, simple pendulum, ballistics) and
Kepler's three theorems on planetary motions; three, Newton's synthesis of all these
phenomena in three neat laws and universal gravity. Besides, two important works played
significant role as methodological models. An ancient one was Euclidean geometry. A
"modern" one (relative to Newton) was Descartes' synthesis of geometry and algebra.
After Newton, analytic and celestial dynamics developed busily for two centuries, yet no
mathematical genius could replace Newton's system in a fundamental way. There was
enormous mathematical branching and growth, yet no essential change came until the
relativistic concepts of space and time staged a revolution at the beginning of this century.
Therefore, both pre- and post-Newton developments evince that mechanical locomotions,
that is the simplest and immediately applicable natural phenomena, could not be first
comprehended by human intellect in any system other than "the Newtonian."
With the perspective of a three-stage formative development of mathematical
mechanics, we can see clearly the resolution of puzzles such as ' 'why Archimedes didn't set
off a scientific revolution," or "why did Archimedes stop short, 1800 years before
Galileo." (See N. Sivin, "Why the Scientific Revolution Did Not Take Place in China—
Or Didn't It?" Chinese Science 5 1982; pp. 61-62.) Although from Archimedes to Galileo
and Kepler the time duration did not have to be as long as 1800 years, there was a big
intellectual barrier to overcome, and Archimedes could not accomplish single-handedly all
that was necessary for the fulfillment of a "mechanical revolution."
But philosophers heralded "the mechanical revolution": without mathematics, F. Bacon
advocated inductive empiricism, tht is experimentation; with mathematics, R. Descartes
demonstrated the tremendous power of a Euclidean-type methodology. In the early 17th
century Western scientists practised sciences in many different directions. However, only
the mathematical summary of mechanical phenomena could reach the wonderful combination of comprehensiveness, exactness, and clarity, which in turn impressed thephilosophes
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of the following generations. Incidentally, the full blossoming of intellectual creativity in
17th- and 18th-century Western Europe accentuates Archimedes' position as a relatively
isolated genius of his time, who could not act as the prime mover of a great social movement, the Scientific Revolution. In view of Sino-European difference in creative eagerness
and mechanical development, what several 17th-century Chinese astronomers did, by following Jesuit instruction in Western calendrical astronomy, can hardly be dubbed a "scientific revolution." Traditional China was weak in exact science, and was particularly weak
in mechanics. An analysis reveals that along the three stage-development, indigenous
Chinese mechanics had only attained the first half stage.
In order to show that mechanics must lead other branches of physics, we can use a table to
make comparisons. Since Needham has faith in the possibility of a leading electromagnetism (see note 11), we compare it with mechanics:
Subjects
Items to be
compared

Mechanics

Electromagnetism

natural phenomena the
subject accounts for

movements in daily life
and in general planetary
observations

comparatively special

the formulation of
mathematized axioms of
the subject

comparatively easy and
requires no advanced
mathematics

difficult; requires partial
differential equations

the mutual relation of the
two compared subjects

naturally provides basic
concepts for other
branches of physics

almost inconceivable
that an "initiallyestablished" electromagnetism would
provide basic concepts
for a "subsequentlyestablished" mechanics

In other words mechanics covers the larger and more immediate range of observations.
Besides, it also deals with the easiest—in terms of creating a theoretical basis. The
hypothesis that electromagnetism might have led the "physical revolution" is insupportable in the sense that we can imagine building a multi-story building by starting from the top
floor, but we cannot imagine people accept this ad hoc procedure as an economic, logical,
and historical way of doing things. The basic methods of exact science—accurate and
verifiable formulation, observation, experimentation, rigorous logic, and
mathematisation—also appeared spontaneously and sporadically in areas other than
planetary astronomy and terrestrial mechanics, yet the actual breakthrough, that is the
Scientific Revolution consummated in a "mechanical revolution," had to happen as it
actually did.
9. In a recent article, "Rivers of Science," in the book China. 7000 Years of Discovery
(1982 by the China Science and Technology Palace Preparatory Committee, Beijing and the
Ontario Science Centre, Toronto) Needham again addresses a number of basic issues,
including, in my terminology, the problem of the criterion of scientific "modernity." He
writes:
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. . . why had modern science developed in Europe alone? It happened in the time of
Galileo, the great astronomer. Leonardo da Vinci, though a genius, did not belong to
the time of modern science. One might say also that Tycho Brahe did not, though
Kepler perhaps did.
Owing to the meaning o f ' 'modern" and "modernity," seeking a chronological criterion for
' 'scientific modernity" has been a straightforward pursuit. Nevertheless, I want to point out
that the very idea of "scientific modernity" excludes a chronological criterion, because
science means exact knowledge and methods, whereas the progress of knowledge is not a
uniformly gradual process from inexactness to exactness. To put it differently, some very
' 'modern" scientific concepts had actually appeared very early (but their contribution to the
formation of the system of modern science was a much later affair). In his previous writings
(e.g., The Grand Titration, pp. 14-15), Needham also showed his preoccupation with the
time factor. From the above 1982 quotation of his we see that his consistent criterion is
Europocentric as well as heavily chronological.
10. As early as in the Spring and Autumn (722-480 BC), the Chinese were familiar with
a procedure, "plus and minus to three divisions" (which Needham calls "the Chinese spiral
of fifths"), to construct a good twelve-note scale by multiplying a basic frequency alternately by the fractions 2/3 and 4/3. As a pentatonic scale, the Chinese gamut conforms
exactly with the Pythagorean scale, but it cannot make an exact octave: the discrepancy is
that between 1/2 and 262144/5331441. Chinese musical practice had never developed the
sophistication to use all 12 notes; yet this numerical procedure, and the persistent efforts
over centuries that improved it step by step (documented improvements made in the Han,
the (Liu) Song, the Liang, the Jin, and the Song Dynasties), indicate that there were
scholars who were theoretically minded, and that they wanted to generalize and
mathematise empirical facts. The major effort aimed at making an equal-tempered scale,
the essence of which is that the ratio of one note to another depends only on the differences
of the numbering between them (from which an exact octave would ensue automatically).
The "plus and minus to three divisions" is not equal-tempered. Even if we divide an octave
into 12 equal divisions (by "length"), these divisions do not form an equal-tempered scale,
since for example
(ll/12)/(9/12) =(11/9) =1.22 . . . = (9/12)/(7/12) =(9/7) =1.28 . . . This persistent effort was finally crowned in the hands of Zhu Zai-yu, a Ming prince. He solved the question
by pointing out that if the 12 divisions between for instance 1 and 2 (convenient to be
expressed in the following series) is made at these numbers:

2 ( = 1 ) , 2 , 2 , . . . 2' ( = 2 )
0/,2

1/12

2/12

2/12

then the ratio of any two notes, for example the ratio between numbers m and n, is

2m/!2/2n/12 _2<ni-n)/12

which depends on the difference (m-n) only, and has nothing to do with the positions of m
and/or n themselves. In this way the scale is equally tempered, and an instrument of this
scale can play any key by an adjustment of "parallel displacement."
11. See Needham, Science and Civilization in China, Vol. IV, p. 1.
12. Alongside this physical refutation (see also note 8), we can offer a historical one.
When Needham hypothesized that electromagnetism might have led the physical revolution, he seemed to have forgotten his fellow countryman William Gilbert, a Renaissance
man, who published his milestone work "De Magnete" in 1600. So long as we make a
quick comparison between this 1600 European publication with the Chinese magnetism as,
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for instance, summarised in Needham's Vol. IV, we see clearly that Needham's logic
collapses completely: "De Magnete" certainly contains anything that medieval China
knew about magnetism, and much more. Moreover, the treatments in ' 'De Magnete" were
more accurate and more systematized.
William Gilbert's contribution preceded somewhat those of Kepler, Galileo, Bacon,
Harvey, Descartes, and others, yet physical magnetism, or electromagnetism, had to wait
for two centuries to mature. The electromagnetic counterpart of thePrincipia is J. Maxwell's two volume Electricity and Magnetism published almost exactly two hundred years
after Newton.
13. By the ' 'law of physical causality," which has already appeared in note 6,1 mean that
any causation is effected by a physical interaction, i ,e., through certain material transmission; and that maximum speed of material transmission never exceeds the speed of light
(which, according to special relativity, is the same in any inertial frame of system).
14. In fact 1922 also saw the publication of Hu Shi's The Development of the Logical
Methods in Ancient China (The Oriental Book Company, Shanghai, 1922). Although the
term "science" is rarely mentioned in this original study, it is nonetheless an important
book on China's scientific stagnation. After discoursing on the logical methods of various
schools of pre-Qin China, Hu Shi concluded his book by translating a two-page article from
Sima Qian's Records of a Historian, describing the First Emperor of Qin's brutal suppression of scholarship and learned men. His message is clear.
In the recent issue ofJournal of Dialectics of Nature which contains the special section of
inquiry into the causes of China's backwardness (note 2 above), there is a paper by He Xiu,
"On the Academic Disparity between China and the West." The paper traces China's
incompetence ' 'to nurture a new type of scientific and technological system" to the difference between pre-Qin Chinese philosophers and Greek philosophers in their aims, attitudes, and methodologies. But the persuasiveness of this analysis is much weakened by
Hu Shi's 1922 book, which displays a remarkable richness of logical study in pre-Qin
China.
Although Feng You-lan's approach is philosophical, He Xiu's is cultural, and mine is
politico-ideological, we all accept the impossibility of a spontaneous Scientific Revolution
in traditional China. Hu Shi tried to adopt a political approach, but he was rather inconsistent on the question of China's stagnation (see note 26). As early as 1915 Ren Hong-jun
published in Ke-xue (Science) Vol. I, "Shuo Zhong-guo wu Ke-xue zhi Yuan-yin (Remarks on the Causes of China's Lack of Science)." Ren attributes the major cause to the
failure to develop the inductive method. Therefore his approach may be called methodological , or scientific.
It seems that the year 1922 represents a highlight in the confrontation of scientific
importation and traditional thoughts in China. In that year one of the "most outstanding
20th-century Chinese Buddhist thinkers claimed that Buddhism 'included science.'" (See
Wing-Tsit Chan, "Neo-Confucianism and Chinese Scientific Thought,"Philosophy East
and West, Vol. 6, 1957; p. 311.)
15. B. Russell, The Problem of China (G. Allen & Unwin LTD, 1922); p. 10.
16. Ibid.; p. 194.
17. In order to understand our general argument (in fact a mechanistic or reductionist
stand), it may be useful to mention another contrast in this connection. Russell wrote in his
1922 book, The Problem of China (pp. 81-82):
The real problem for the Chinese intellectuals is to acquire Western knowledge without acquiring the mechanistic outlook.
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Perhaps itis not clear what I mean by "the mechanistic outlook." . . . Whatlmean
is the habit of regarding mankind as raw material, to be moulded by our scientific
manipulation into whatever form may happen to suit our fancy.
Now Lin Yu-tang in his essay, "Han Fei As a Cure for Modern China" (Hu Shi & Lin
Yu-tang, China's Own Critics, Paragon Book Reprint Corp., 1969; p. 94 and p. 93), wrote
sometime before 1931:
What interests me most is that there we have a mechanistic conception of government
by law pushed almost to the extremes, a theory that would be more typical of the
German mind than of the Chinese way of thinking.
By a "mechanistic conception of government" Lin meant that
in contrast to the Confucian dictum that "ceremony should not be applied to the
plebeians, and punishment should not be extended to the lords," we have here a legalist
who says that we should have a law that doesn't fawn upon the mighty, a rule that
should be applied rigidly, so that wherever the law applies, the clever will submit and
the powerful will not protest, that the nobility should not be exempted from punishment and rewards should not go over the heads of the humble.
Indeed we do not quite follow Russell since he puts "our scientific manipulation" and
"our fancy" together. I think human laws are something between science and fancy—
neither purely scientific, nor purely fanciful. Consequently I think that in the above-quoted
passages, we may understand that Russell and Lin were more or less talking about the
same thing, about what philosophical outlook and mental attitude should the 20th-century
Chinese people adopt—in order to survive and prosper in a rapidly changing world, or to
preserve traditional, "precious" Chinese virtues (cf. note 15 above).
18. Yu Lan Fung (Feng You-lan), "Why China Has No Science," The International
Journal of Ethics, Vol. 32, No. 3 (April 1922); p. 237.
19. Ibid.; p. 238.
20. Ibid.; p. 259.
21. I certainly appreciate the great significance of this summary per se. Besides philosophical and methodological differences between the Needham school and me, however, I
can add the following metaphorical explanations:
When one is seriously ill one needs a doctor, that is to say one needs a truthful diagnosis
in the first place. The patient does not need a "historian-prophet" who is preoccupied in
lecturing about how healthy the patient had been in the past and how strong the patient will
be in the future.
My another metaphorical statement is: excessive glorification of my ancestors is in fact
an insult to me.
If I may also use this opportunity to mention briefly the political difference between
Needham and me, I should say that his essay "The Past in China's Present" astonished me
by its gross misunderstanding of the basic aspiration of the present-day Chinese people. In a
nutshell, Needham tells us that the Chinese people would be very happy in an ideal, or the
best, traditional Chinese society, and that under Mao and his party, China is, orapproaches,
that ideal society. The actual Chinese development that followed Needham's eulogy of the
Chinese dictatorship, the communes, the Great Leap Forward, etc. demonstrates, 1 think,
two basic Chinese traditionalisms: one is into what an extreme absurdity the Chinese
autocracy can lead the nation, and the other is the extreme hatred the people harbor against
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the Chinese autocracy. That this horrible situation is still a living reality in China evinces
nothing but that Maoist one-party dictatorship represents at once the worst and the most
effective Chinese autocracy.
22. I want to re-quote a passage from Needham's vol. D (P. 286). Levy-Bruhl writes:
Chinese scientific knowledge affords a striking example of this arrested development.
It has produced immense encyclopaedias of astronomy, physics . . . and yet to our
minds all this is nothing but balderdash. How can so much effort and skill have been
expended in the long course of ages, and yet their product be absolute nil? . . . those
whoarebest acquainted with the Chinese mentality . . . almost despair of seeing it free
from its shackles, and cease revolving on its own axis . . .
I agree with this passage on a descriptive level since I identify myself with the group who
despair of seeing China free from its shackles. Yet I must add one qualification to balance
the record: that Western Europe finally produced modern science was, in a sense, because it
had a much bigger, and, more important, a more variegated store of "balderdash." About
this very passage Needham remarks, "It would be hard to find a passage more misguided."
23. J. Needham, The Grand Titration (University of Toronto Press, 1969); p. 213.
24. By macro-history I mean that the questions with which we want to deal and the
factors behind these questions have an enduring character.
In a sense my faith in macro-historical reasoning is based on the analogy that in engineering design thermodynamical calculations are important, and in many cases necessary.
Macrohistorical reasoning helps us to judge statements like "until the middle of the 17th
century Chinese and European scientific theories were almost on a par," or to answer
questions like whether traditional China had rational and theoretical inquiries in mechanical science.
25. In a 1982 article, "Rivers of Science" (note 9 above), Needham addresses the
stagnation problem this way:
Many people often realize some of the great things that were done in China in ancient
and medieval times, but after that they talk of a ' 'stagnation " which overcame Chinese
culture. We do not believe in this at all; what we say is that the course of discovery and
invention in China went on slowly all through the ages . . .
26. A typical passage of the theory that "hardware decides" belongs to Hu Shi. Hu Shi,
The Chinese Renaissance (The University of Chicago Press, 1934); p. 63:
The difference between the Eastern and Western civilization is primarily a difference
in the tools used. The West has during the last two hundred years moved far ahead of
the East merely because certain Western nations have been able to devise new tools for
the conquest of nature and for the multiplication of the power to do work. The East,
whence have come a number of the epoch-making tools of ancient civilization, has
failed to carry on that great tradition and is left behind in the stage of manual labor
while the Western world has long entered the age of steam and electricity.
A slogan painted on the wall of a hall in Chicago's Museum of Science and Industry
provides another example: "Tools make America great."
My theorem that "software decides" came from pondering over Chinese history: traditional China invented important hardware such as printing, gunpowder, and the magnetic
compass, yet it was the persistent Chinese software, the unified imperial institution combined with strict ideological control, that played the decisive role.
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27. In the Preface of Tian Gong Kai Wu (a book on Chinese technology written in the
17th century), Song Ying-xing wrote angrily:
An ambitious scholar will undoubtedly toss this book onto his desk and give it no
further thought; it is a work that is in no way concerned with the art of advancement in
officialdom.
See E-tu Zen Sun & Shiou-Chuan Sun, translators, Tien Kung K'ai Wu (The Pennsylvania
State University Press, 1966); p. xiv.
28. The Institute of the History of Natural Sciences, Academia Sinica, eds., Zhong-guo
Gu-dai Ke-ji Cheng-jiu (The Scientific and Technological Achievements in China's Past
(Beijing, 1978; 1980 reprint).
29. This formulation belongs to Professor W. Monter.
30. Edwin Reischauer, The Japanese (Harvard University Press, 1977); p. 52.
31. As early as at the end of the Tokugawa shogunate, the idea of ' 'government through
public discussion" was developed. After the Restoration, this idea was further replaced by
"respect for public opinion," and in the heat of the civil wars of 1868, the young emperor
declared: "Knowledge shall be sought throughout the world, so as to strengthen the foundation of imperial rule." In other words, Japan at this time became fully aware of the necessity
of changing its "software," whereas the Manchu regime in China held on to its "software"
as its lifeblood.
32. At the Buffalo meeting I still used the name the "principle of degree of intellectual
mobilization." After discussion with Professor Joravsky, I have now decided this name, the
' 'principle of degree of intellectual activation and creativity." When developing a theory on
the growth of modern science I first used the Maoist phrase the "mass movement"—an
inheritable "mass movement" among intellectual elites. Then again I used the Maoist term
"mobilization." (I am an eclectic man.) But it was not implied that there were necessarily
conscious efforts on the part of political or spiritual authorities to mobilize intellectual
elites to engage in intellectual activities in various fields. I meant that the social environment itself "did" the "mobilization"—being conducive, or neutral, or inimical. Therefore
"mobilization" is not an accurate term; "activation" is good, and "creativity" is necessary.
The principle is phenomenological, because it admits that more basic factors work
behind intellectual activation and creativity on a societal scale: in certain specific ways
some factors promote creativity, while others inhibit it.
The Sino-European contrast in political structures is an illustration of the principle. First
there is its extensive aspect. Although China had the tradition of "promotion through
examinations," there were not many universities in China—if "Guo-zi-jian" can be called
the imperial university. In Europe, kingdoms, city-states, bishoprics, and principalities
took on responsibilities for a number of institutions. As soon as universities started in
Western Europe they spread rapidly. Ideological tolerance and cultural receptivity are
positive factors for another aspect of intellectual creativity: pluralism. When in the six
centuries preceding 1905 the Chinese examination system required nothing but a small
collection of Neo-Confucian classics, the detrimental influence in mobilizing, or activating, intellectual creativity was fatal.
In the last few decades of the 16th century, Hideyoshi, one of the founders of Tokugawa
Japan, became so ambitious that he waged a full-fledged invasive ware against Korea and
China. A present-day reader may puzzle over the material basis of this unreal istic ambition.
By some more reading, one found that since the arrival of three Portuguese sailors in 1543,
Japan had made rapid progress in manufacturing light firearms. First, Tokitaka, the daimyo
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who saw the first Portuguese sailors, spent a large sum of money to buy a pair of arquebuses
from them. Then he immediately asked his swordsmith to copy and produce the imported
weapon. Other daimyo also showed great interest in arquebuses and other types of firearms.
The amazing fact is that in only twelve years after 1543 Japan became a manufacturer of
firearms and exported them to southeastern Asia!
China's slow response to light firearms forms a revealing contrast. In the light of the
principle of degree of intellectual activation, we can put the contrast in parallel with the
difference between a provincial governor in imperial China and a daimyo in feudal Japan,
the former a hired manager, the latter the lord of his own territory. In China a literatus
ascended to a high position by competing with his peers in memorizing classics and
composing "eight-legged proses." On the other hand, the life-and-death strife between
Japanese feudal lords demanded that they be prepared to adopt and use any practical means.
The fundamental Sino-Japanese differences are large. As a result, the two countries have
been different in the degree of intellectual activation and creativity.
Once formulated, this principle appears both self-evident and useful. It serves us as a
clear-cut criterion. In examining problems that relate to the growth of modern science and
modernity in general, the principle of degree of intellectual activation and creativity helps
us to identify and analyze advantageous and disadvantageous factors and conditions.
33. T. Najita, Japan, the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Japanese Politics (The
University of Chicago Press, 1974); p. 31:
The term "orthodoxy" is often used to describe Tokugawa political ideology, meaning primarily Neo-Confucianism. This is misleading. The bakufa did not have a
bureaucratic apparatus to enforce an orthodoxy and its own ideology was quite eclectic.
34. In Russell's The Problem of China, especially pp. 45-47, there were analyses about
and denunciations of this harmful system, by both Russell himself and by a Chinese scholar
Li who published early this century. Again we see some differences between Russell's and
Li's stands.
35. Needham, Science and Civilization in China, Vol. II; p. 294.
36. Hu Shi (note 23 above); p. 45.
37. Ibid.; pp. 45-46.
But all these great movements which rightly deserve the term of "renaissances,"
suffered from one common defect, namely, the absence of a conscious recognition of
their historical mission. There was noconscious effort nor articulate interpretation: all
of them were natural developments of historical tendencies and were easily overpowered or swept away by the conservative force of tradition against which they had only
dimly and unconsciously combated . . . they brought in new patterns, but never
completely dethroned the old, which continued to coexist with them and in time
absorbed them.
38. Liang Ch'i-ch'ao(I.C.Y. Hsu, translator), Intellectual Trends in the Ch'ing Period
(Harvard University Press, 1959), p. 19.
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